This paper studies communication and intervention as mechanisms of corporate governance. I develop a model in which a privately informed principal can intervene in the decisions of the agent if the latter disobeys her instructions. The main result shows that intervention can prompt disobedience because it tempts the agent to challenge the principal to back her words with actions. This result provides a novel argument as to why a commitment not to intervene (and therefore, relying solely on communication) can be optimal. In this respect, words do speak louder without actions. The model is applied to managerial leadership, corporate boards, private equity, and shareholder activism.
Introduction
There are di¤erent ways to manage and govern a corporation. For instance, visionary managers often share information with their subordinates to explain their strategy. Some managers rely on their ability to motivate their followers and adopt a hands-o¤ approach, while others retain control and overrule their subordinates when their instructions are not followed. As another example, in many corporations, the board of directors not only monitors and supervises the CEO but also advises management on topics such as strategy, crisis management, and M&A. Some boards are "friendly"to their CEO who is given the …nal say, while others do not hesitate to confront and replace the CEO as needed. Related, investors such as private equity funds and activist hedge funds, who often share their ideas with their portfolio companies how to increase value, also have di¤erent styles of governance. While some investors are quick to exercise their control rights if their ideas are ignored, others are less confrontational and prefer working constructively with management. In all of these principal-agent situations, contracts only partially resolve the con ‡icts of interests, and as a result, communication (i.e., transmission of information, using words) and intervention (i.e., forcing one's will, taking actions) become the primary mechanisms of governance.
The goal of this paper is to understand the interaction between communication and intervention, and study its implications for corporate governance. There is an obvious trade o¤ between the two: while communication is e¤ective only if it is persuasive, intervention is more confrontational and costly. For this reason, intervention is often used as a last resort (Simon (1947) ), and the anticipation of intervention can in and of itself a¤ect the ability to exert in ‡uence through communication. In principle, the two mechanisms can either complement or substitute one another. Which one it is? As the examples above suggest, the extent to which intervention (or the threat of) is used in practice varies considerably. What explains these di¤erent choices?
To study these questions, I develop a principal-agent model with incomplete contracts and a "top-down" information structure. 1 As one might expect, a credible threat of intervention can increase the incentives of the agent to follow the instructions of the principal, i.e., intervention reinforces compliance. In these cases, the two mechanisms complement one another since the best way to avoid the unpleasant consequences of intervention is to follow instructions.
Surprisingly, however, the main result of the paper demonstrates that a credible threat of intervention can also decrease the incentives of the agent to follow the principal's instructions. In those cases, intervention prompts disobedience, communication is less e¤ective with intervention than without it, and the two mechanisms substitute one another. This result is new in the literature. The key insight is that intervention is counterproductive because it tempts the agent to challenge the principal to back her words with actions. Therefore, a commitment not to intervene (i.e., relying solely on communication) can be optimal. In this respect, words do speak louder than (and without) actions.
Building on this core idea, the analysis considers several variants of the baseline model and provides novel predictions. In the context of corporate leadership, the analysis suggests that hands-o¤ management style is more suitable for specialist managers (rather than generalists) in opaque and complex organizations where employees'compensation is related to …rm performances. In the context of corporate boards, the model predicts that friendly boards are optimal when CEOs have less to lose from being monitored (i.e., enjoy high reputation in the CEO labor market or a generous severance package), their compensation is sensitive to performances, the number of directors is large, or directors are busy (e.g., hold other board seats). In the context of private equity and shareholder activism, I argue that sophisticated investors can have their voice heard more e¤ectively when they have reputation for being nonconfrontational, co-invest with other investors (e.g., LBOs'club deals or VCs'syndicates), have large number of portfolio companies, or have better exit options from their investment (i.e., selling their shares, …nding a buyer). Speci…cally in the context of shareholder activism, the analysis highlights that the adoption of an easier proxy access or the facilitation of coordination among shareholders (e.g., through proxy advisory …rms) have unintended consequences and can be counterproductive. Moreover, the ease at which activists can exit their positions (e.g., the liquidity of the stock) enhances their ability to in ‡uence management if and only if running a proxy …ght (i.e., intervention) is su¢ ciently costly.
To gain further insight about how intervention prompts disobedience, which is the common theme behind the implications above, consider the following example. Suppose an agent ("he")
can take one of two actions, L and R. There are three states with a uniform prior. Payo¤s are given by P rincipal
where 2 (1; 2). Both players prefer action R in state R and action L in state L , but since the agent receives an additional private bene…t from action R, they disagree in state M . The principal ("she"), who is privately informed of the state, sends the agent a message which can be interpreted as instructions, a recommendation, or a nonbinding demand. Since the agent is biased toward action R, the challenge is convincing him to choose action L. Communication is modeled as cheap talk (i.e., strategic transmission of information à la Crawford and Sobel (1982) ). Without the possibility of intervention, an informative equilibrium has the following properties: (i) the principal sends message m R in state R and message m L otherwise, and
(ii) the agent takes action R (L) if message m R (m L ) is sent. In this equilibrium, which exists if and only if < because M is pooled with L by the principal's message, such a deviation is not possible. In a sense, the principal deliberately conceals information the agent is likely to abuse.
The novel feature of the model is the possibility of intervention. Suppose that after the agent acts the principal can pay a cost c > 0 and reverse the agent's action. Intuitively, the principal can overrule the agent and perform the task on her own, force the agent to repeat the work, monitor the agent closely, or …nd a replacement. The cost of intervention is the principal's alternative use of resources, e¤ort, time, and attention, or her aversion to confrontation. If c 2 (c 1) then the cost is too large (small), and if the agent deviates to action R after message m L then the principal never (always) intervenes. In those cases, the possibility of intervention has no e¤ect on the outcome. But if 1 < c < 2 then the above equilibrium breaks down: the agent knows that if he deviates to action R after message m L , the principal will intervene if and only if the state is L , which results in precisely the outcome 2 Since 2 + > 0, the agent always chooses action R after message m R . Conditional on message m L , the agent's expected utility from action L and R is that the agent wants. By contrast, although intervention is optional, the principal is worse o¤ with the possibility of intervention, she now has to pay c to implement action L in state L .
Intuitively, by disobeying the principal, the agent forces her to make a decision that inevitably reveals information she was trying to conceal. Indeed, if the agent ignores the principal's instructions, the principal must decide whether to intervene. Since intervention is an informed but costly decision, the principal intervenes if and only if she believes that the agent's decision is detrimental, i.e., the state is L . Therefore, if the principal does not intervene, she e¤ectively "con…rms" the decision of the agent to disobey her instructions. Since the agent "called her blu¤", he can now consume his private bene…ts in state M . On the other hand, if the principal intervenes, she "corrects" the agent's initial decision. This correction bene…ts the agent since it reverses course exactly when the consequences of his actions are detrimental.
Either way, similar to the winner's curse in common value auctions and pivotal considerations in strategic voting, the agent can condition on the information that would be re ‡ected by the decision of the principal to intervene. Altogether, the possibility of intervention creates additional tension by providing the agent with opportunity to challenge the principal to back her words with actions. Through this novel channel intervention prompts disobedience.
This core idea holds more generally. Speci…cally, the example above abstracts from the direct costs borne by the agent when the principal intervenes (e.g., loss of compensation, damaged reputation, or embarrassment). When considering whether to ignore the principal's instructions, the agent trades o¤ these costs against the bene…t from "eliciting" additional information. The relative cost of intervention, that is, the ratio between the cost borne by the principal and the cost that intervention in ‡icts on the agent, plays a key role in the analysis.
In Section 2, I show that the likelihood that the agent follows the principal's instructions in equilibrium has a U-shape as a function of this ratio. When the relative cost of intervention is small, the punishment e¤ect dominates and intervention reinforces compliance; but when the ratio is large, the informational bene…ts from challenging the principal dominate and intervention prompts disobedience. 3 Furthermore, with more than two actions, I show that when intervention prompts disobedience (reinforces compliance), the agent chooses more (less) ex- 3 While other studies argued that intervention can reinforce compliance (e.g., Matthews (1989) , Shimizu (2008) , Marino, Matsusaka, and Zábojník (2010) , Van den Steen (2010) , and Levit (2014) ), this paper is the …rst to show that intervention prompts disobedience. The key di¤erences are: (i) here, intervention changes the agent's decision; and (ii) in this model the agent cares to learn about the principal's private information.
treme actions which are more di¢ cult (easier) to reverse, and consequently, the amount of information that is revealed by the principal in equilibrium is lower (higher).
A commitment not to intervene in the agent's decision bene…ts the principal only if intervention prompts disobedience. Therefore, a commitment is optimal when the relative cost of intervention is su¢ ciently high. In those cases, the principal is better o¤ by solely relying on her ability to communicate with the agent and persuade him to follow her instructions. Moreover, I show that such commitment is more valuable when the con ‡ict of interests with the agent is small. This result is not obvious since as the con ‡ict of interests decreases, communication becomes more e¤ective both with intervention and without it. Overall, the model provides novel predictions about the circumstances under which intervention is counterproductive.
The ability of the principal to commit not to intervene in the agent's decision, the bene…t from such commitment, as well as the channel through which a commitment can be obtained, depend on the context and the application of the model. In Section 4, I discuss in details the application of the model to managerial leadership, corporate boards, private equity, and shareholder activism. These applications share the main elements of the model.
To shed more light on these applications, I extend the baseline model and study situations in which (i) the principal is a group of individuals who are subject to coordination problems such as free-riding (e.g., a board of directors); (ii) the principal cannot observe the agent's action before deciding whether to intervene (e.g., an opaque organization/…rm); (iii) the quality of the principal's private information is imperfect (e.g., specialist vs. generalist managers, investors with expertise in a speci…c industry); (iv) the agent is also privately informed. Interestingly, when an informed agent disobeys the principal, the principal cannot tell for sure if it is because the agent's private information contradicts her own information or because of their con ‡ict of interests. This force deters the principal from intervening and emboldens the agent. Therefore, with two-sided information asymmetry, intervention is even more likely to prompt disobedience and less information is communicated by the principal in equilibrium.
This paper contributes to the literature in several ways. Starting with Dessein (2002) , a number of papers studied the trade o¤ between delegation and strategic communication in organizations, 4 and its applications to optimal board structure (Adams and Ferreira (2007 (2007)). 5 In my paper there are no hold-up problems, and therefore, the bene…t from a commitment not to intervene in the agent's decision arises under di¤erent circumstances: intervention is less (more) e¤ective as a governance tool especially when the consequences for the agent from intervention/monitoring are mild (dire).
Finally, existing models in which corporate leaders have informational advantage focus on the leader's role in coordinating the various activities of the …rm (e.g., Hermalin (1998); Bolton,
Brunnermeier and Veldkamp (2013)). 6 My paper contributes to this literature by showing that the ease at which corporate leaders can exercise their power diminishes their ability to in ‡uence others to voluntarily follow their vision.
Setup
Consider a principal-agent environment in which payo¤s depend on action x 2 fL; Rg and a random variable e that has a continuous probability density function f with full support over
; . The principal's payo¤ is given by v( e ; x) 0. In Section 3.4, I consider a version of the model with a continuum of actions. Let
be a strictly increasing and continuous function with ( ) < 0 < . The …rst assumption implies that the relative bene…t from action R increases with e , and the second assumption 5 The idea that ex-post e¢ cient intervention can be ex-ante counterproductive is also discussed by Crémer (1995) . There, however, communication, disobedience, and the interplay with intervention are not studied. 6 Saloner (1993, 2000) also focus on the vision aspect of leadership, but without modeling a top-down communication. See Bolton, Brunnermeier, and Veldkamp (2010) for a related survey.
guarantees that the principal's preferences are not trivial: she prefers action R over L if and only if ( e ) > 0. To ease the exposition, I use e for ( e ) and for ( ) whenever there is no risk of confusion.
The agent's payo¤ is given by
where ! > 0 is a scalar and e is a random variable, privately known to the agent, independent of e , with a continuous probability density function g and full support over [0; 1). Parameter ! is the relative weight the agent puts on v( e ; x). The agent prefers action R over L if and only if e > e =!. Thus, when e 2 ( e =!; 0) the principal and the agent have di¤erent preferences over actions. E¤ectively, e captures the intrinsic con ‡ict of interests between the principal and the agent, where larger e and smaller ! result in a larger bias toward action R.
The assumption that e is the agent's private information is immaterial for the analysis; its main role is to ease the exposition of the main results as will become clear later. give all the pecuniary bene…ts from the project to the agent. 8 The model has four stages:
The …rst stage involves communication between the principal and the agent. While the agent is privately informed about e , the principal is privately informed about e . For simplicity, I assume that the principal perfectly observes e while the agent is uninformed about e . The former assumption is relaxed in Section 3.3 and the latter assumption is relaxed in 7 Assuming Pr[ e 0] = 0 is immaterial for the main results. In the Online Appendix I show that similar results hold when e has full support over ( 1; 1) . 8 For details on an interpretation of ! as a division of cash- ‡ows, see the remark at the end of Section 2.2.
Section 3.5. Based on her private information, the principal sends the agent message m 2 ; .
In line with a standard cheap talk framework, the principal's information about e is nonveri…able and the content of m does not a¤ect the agent's or the principal's payo¤ directly.
These assumptions capture the informal nature of communication. I denote by ( e ) 2 ;
the message sent by the principal and by M the set of messages on the equilibrium path.
Stage 2:
In the second stage, the agent observes the message from the principal and chooses between the two actions. I denote by x A (m; e ) 2 fL; Rg the decision of the agent conditional on observing message m and his private bene…ts e .
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Stage 3: The third stage is the key departure of the model from the existing literature.
The principal observes the agent's decision and decides whether to intervene and override it.
Formally, let x P ( e ; x A ) 2 fL; Rg be the principal's decision. If x P = x A then the principal did not intervene and the agent's decision is implemented. In this case, neither the principal nor the agent incurs any costs. If x P 6 = x A then the principal intervenes and changes the agent's decision. 10 In this case, the principal incurs a cost c 2 (0; j j) and the agent incurs a cost 0. If instead c j j, then intervention is too costly to have any e¤ect. In the applications which I discuss in Section 4, the costs and c can be either pecuniary or non-pecuniary.
Stage 4:
Payo¤s are realized and distributed to the principal and the agent. Overall, the principal and the agent maximize their expected utilities, which are given respectively by u P ( e ; x A ; x P ; c) =
and u A ( e ; x A ; x P ; e ; !; ) =
Solution concept
A Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the game consists of three parts: The principal's communication strategy , the agent's decision x A , and the principal's intervention strategy x P . 9 Since the agent is indi¤erent with zero probability, I restrict attention to pure strategies. 10 A previous version of the paper shows similar results when the agent's action can only be partly reversed.
Speci…cally, the equilibrium is de…ned as follows: (i) For any realization of e , if ( e ) = m then m maximizes the expected utility of the principal conditional on e and given x A and x P where the expectations are taken with respect to e ; (ii) for any message m 2 M , the strategy x A maximizes the expected utility of the agent given and x P where the expectations are taken with respect to e conditional on m; (iii) for any realization of e and x A 2 fL; Rg, x P maximizes the expected utility of the principal. Finally, all players have rational expectations in that each player's belief about the other players'strategies is correct in equilibrium. Moreover, the agent uses Bayes'rules to update their beliefs from the principal's message about e . 11 The principal learns from a A about e , but this information is immaterial for her decision to intervene. 12 For this reason, similar results hold if instead the principal chooses the probability that intervention succeeds, , at a cost of c ( ), where c 0 > 0 and c 00 > 0.
As in any cheap-talk game, there always exists an equilibrium in which the agent ignores all messages from the principal, and these messages are uninformative. These equilibria are often referred to as babbling equilibria and their outcome is equivalent to assuming no communication between the principal and the agent. 
The principal intervenes as described by Lemma 1.
Without communication, the agent cannot avoid intervention even if he forgoes his private bene…ts and chooses action L. If b N 0 then the agent "follows his bias"and chooses action R with probability one, even though it triggers intervention by the principal whenever c < e . If b N > 0 then the agent "goes against his bias"and chooses action L when e is small. Intuitively, based on his prior about e , the agent believes that action L is less likely to trigger intervention than action R.
With communication, the principal can in ‡uence the agent's decision by sending the appropriate message. Communication is e¤ective only if in equilibrium the principal reveals information about e and the agent conditions his decision on this information with a positive probability. I refer to equilibria with this property as in ‡uential.
De…nition 1 An equilibrium is in ‡uential if there exist 0 0 and
Since the principal uses her in ‡uence to maximize her expected payo¤ as given by (3), in any in ‡uential equilibrium there are exactly two disjoint sets of messages on the equilibrium path, M R and M L , with distinctive properties. Messages in M R maximize the probability that the agent chooses action R, and messages in M L maximize the probability that the agent chooses action L. Therefore, messages in M R can be interpreted as instructions to choose R, and messages in M L can be interpreted as instructions to choose L. Note that both M R and M L can have more than one message in equilibrium. 13 Based on (3), if the equilibrium is in ‡uential then e 0 ) m 2 M R and e < 0 ) m 2 M L . Hereafter, I use the terminology "instructing the agent" to describe the principal's communication strategy. Overall, if the equilibrium is in ‡uential then the principal instructs the agent to choose action R if e 0 and action L if e < 0.
An in ‡uential equilibrium exists only if the agent …nds it in his best interests to follow the principal's instructions. Suppose the principal sends a message m 2 M R . The agent follows the instructions and chooses action R if and only if
The left hand side of (6) is the agent's expected payo¤ if he follows instructions. In this case, the principal does not intervene, action R is implemented, and the agent consumes his private bene…ts. The right hand side of (6) 
The left hand side of (7) is the agent's expected payo¤ if he follows instructions. In this case, the principal does not intervene and action L is implemented. The right hand side of (7) is the agent's expected payo¤ if he disobeys the principal and chooses action R. If e < c then the principal intervenes, the agent's decision is reversed, and he incurs an additional cost .
If e c then the principal does not intervene, the agent's decision is unchanged, and he consumes his private bene…ts. The next result shows that the agent follows the principal's instructions if and only if e b ( ; c), which is given by expression (8) below. 
If the agent follows the instructions to choose action L then the principal never intervenes.
If the agent ignores the instructions to choose action L, the principal intervenes if and only if e < c.
(ii) Every in ‡uential equilibrium Pareto dominates every non-in ‡uential equilibrium.
Since a larger b ( ; c) implies a higher probability that the agent follows the instructions of the principal in equilibrium, the threshold b ( ; c) measures the e¤ectiveness of communication. is the unique solution of
Part (i) of Corollary 1 is intuitive: the principal intervenes only if the agent ignores her instructions, and in order to avoid the negative consequences of intervention, the agent is more likely to follow the principal's instructions when is higher. Also, as ! increases, the con ‡ict of interests between the principal and the agent is e¤ectively smaller, and therefore, the agent is more likely to follow the principal's instructions. Part (ii) is more subtle. According to Proposition 2, the probability of intervention in equilibrium is
The principal does not need to intervene if the agent follows her instructions. Since b ( ; c) increases with and !, ( ; c) is decreasing in and !. By contrast, ( ; c) has an inverted U-shape as a function of c. Intervention serves only as a threat, which results with a low probability of intervention. However, if c is large, intervention is too costly and the principal is less likely to intervene even if the agent disobeys her. Therefore, intervention is observed only if it is not credible enough to deter the agent from ignoring the principal's instructions, but it is su¢ ciently pro…table as a corrective tool. 14 As a result, unobserved intervention is not necessarily evidence that intervention is ine¤ective. Remark on equilibrium selection Since multiple equilibria always exist, hereafter, I assume that the equilibrium in play is in ‡uential (which always exists). Selecting the most informative equilibrium is standard in the literature. Part (ii) of Proposition 2 also supports this selection. 15 
Does intervention prompt disobedience?
To understand the interaction between communication and intervention, consider a benchmark in which intervention is either prohibitively costly or entirely ine¤ective. This is a special case of the baseline model with c > j j. According to Proposition 2,
Therefore, communication is considered less e¤ective with intervention than without it if and only if
If condition (12) holds then intervention prompts disobedience, and otherwise, intervention reinforces compliance. The next result follows immediately from (12) .
Proposition 3 Suppose c < j j. Intervention prompts disobedience if and only if
To understand the intuition behind Proposition 3, note that the agent is willing to forgo her private bene…ts and choose action L if he learns that e < e =!. However, in equilibrium, the principal does not reveal whether e < e =! or e 2 [ e =!; 0). The principal intentionally conceals this information, because if she did not, the agent would have chosen action R when e > e =!. Instead, the principal pretends that e is lower than it really is in order to persuade the agent to choose L even when e > e =!. The agent understands the principal's incentives, and hence, the only information that can be inferred from the instructions to choose action L is e < 0.
Intervention allows the agent to elicit information from the principal that is otherwise not revealed by her instructions. If the agent ignores the principal's instructions, the principal has to decide whether to intervene. Intervention is an informed decision. In equilibrium, the principal intervenes only if she is convinced that the implementation of action R is su¢ ciently detrimental to justify incurring the costs of intervention. Therefore, the principal's decision to intervene reveals the value of e relative to c. In particular, if the principal does not intervene, the agent infers that the principal believes that choosing action R does not justify intervention, that is, e > c. These are the states in which the agent prefers consuming his private bene…ts even at the expense of a lower value of v( e ; x). In those cases, the principal's decision not to intervene "con…rms"the agent's initial decision to disobey. On the other hand, if the principal intervenes, the agent infers that the principal believes that choosing action R is detrimental, that is, e < c. Since the agent is also concerned about the value of v( e ; x), he prefers forgoing his private bene…ts when he learns that e is low. In those cases, intervention bene…ts the agent since it "corrects"his initial decision when it is indeed detrimental.
By ignoring the principal's instructions the agent e¤ectively "forces"the principal to make an informed decision which inevitably reveals information about e she was trying to conceal.
Against this informational bene…t, the agent su¤ers the direct cost of intervention, . Combined, the agent bene…ts from the principal's intervention if and only if ! e + e < . Note that when deciding whether to intervene, the principal behaves as if she is biased toward action R, where the bias is c. Therefore, if !c + e then the principal's "bias" coincides with the preferences of the agent. As can be seen by (9) , the minimum of b ( ; c) as a function of c is obtained when !c = + b ( ; c). When c = c min the agent's informational bene…t from intervention is the highest, and hence, the likelihood that the agent follows the principal's instructions is the lowest. This also explains the intuition behind part (ii) of Corollary 1.
Proposition 3 also implies that intervention is more likely to prompt disobedience when the con ‡ict of interests between the principal and the agent is smaller (high !). Note that higher ! increases the in ‡uence of the principal over the agent both with and without intervention.
However, Proposition 3 suggests that the positive e¤ect of ! is weaker with intervention. There are two reasons behind this result. First, without intervention, the only force that governs the incentives of the agent to comply is learning about e . By contrast, with intervention, the agent also tries to avoid the cost , and therefore, the e¤ect of ! is weaker. Second, the agent's informational bene…ts from disobedience increase with !, as the agent has stronger incentives to learn about e . Therefore, agents who are compensated for performances are more likely to comply with instructions without the possibility of intervention. In this respect, pay for performances and intervention are substitutes. . Importantly, intervention prompts disobedience only because intervention is an informed decision. Hypothetically, if the principal could commit to intervening whenever the agent ignores her instructions, then intervention would necessarily reinforce compliance. Intuitively, since the principal's decision to intervene does not depend on e , ignoring the instructions of the principal imposes a direct cost on the agent without providing the informational bene…t of correction and con…rmation.
Remark on biased self-perception The analysis does not depend on the cost of intervention itself, but rather on the belief of the agent about the principal's self-perception of this cost.
For example, if it is a common knowledge that the principal underestimates (overestimates) the di¢ culty of intervening in the agent's decision, for all purposes of the analysis, the relevant cost of intervention is lower (higher). Therefore, an overcon…dent principal, who behaves as if the cost of intervention c is smaller than it really is, will be able to exert more in ‡uence on the agent through communication if and only if c < c min . In those cases, overcon…dence can bene…t the principal. 16 
The value of intervention
The principal' s perspective If intervention prompts disobedience then the principal can bene…t from a commitment not to intervene in the agent's decision. Building on Proposition 2, the principal's expected payo¤ in any in ‡uential equilibrium is
Pr
where ( ; c) is given by (10) . The …rst line of (14) is the principal's expected utility if her …rst best is implemented. The second line is the principal's expected disutility when the agent disobeys her. The …rst term in that line is the disutility when principal does not intervene and the second term is the disutility when she does.
Several implications follow. First, since b ( ; c) increases with and !, so does U P ( ; c).
Intuitively, with higher or ! the agent has stronger incentives to follow the principal's instructions either because he tries to avoid the costs of intervention or because he puts a smaller weight on his private bene…ts. This bene…ts the principals since she can exert in ‡uence on the agent without incurring the cost of intervention. Second, the principal obtains the highest payo¤ when c = 0. Interestingly,
That is, if > 0 the principal obtains her …rst best without ever intervening in equilibrium;
the threat is su¢ cient. However, if = 0 then the principal intervenes with probability one to obtain her …rst best. Third, in most applications intervention is costly. The next result shows that although intervention is optional, if c is large then a commitment not to intervene in the agent's decision can bene…t the principal.
Proposition 4 U P ( ; c) increases in and !. Moreover,
(ii) If =! < E[ e j e < 0] + j j then there is c 2 (c ; j j) such that U P ( ; j j) > U P ( ; c)
for all c 2 (c; j j).
How can the principal be better o¤ without the option to intervene? This is possible only if intervention prompts disobedience. Based on Proposition 3, it is necessary that c > c , where c is the value of c that satis…es condition (13) The agent' s perspective The agent's expected payo¤ in any in ‡uential equilibrium is
The …rst line of (16) is similar to the …rst line of (14), with the adjustment of ! and the addition of the agent's private bene…ts. The second line of (16) is the agent's expected net bene…t from disobeying the principal, which is given by e b ( ; c). By revealed preferences, this term is always positive.
The value of the agent's option to disobey the principal decreases with , and therefore, U A ( ; c) decreases with as well. Also, since v( e ; x) 0, higher ! increases the payo¤ of the agent without harming his option to disobey the principal. As the next result shows, the e¤ect of c is more subtle.
Proposition 5 U A ( ; c) decreases in and increases in !. Moreover,
(ii) If =! < E[ e =!j e =! > E[ e j e < 0]] + j j then there is c 2 (c ; j j) such that U A ( ; c) > U A ( ; j j) for all c 2 c; j j .
Part (i) of Proposition 5 is intuitive: to avoid the punishment e¤ect of intervention, the agent prefers a principal who is unlikely to intervene (high c). By contrast, according to part
(ii), the agent can be better o¤ with a principal that has the option to intervene. Intuitively, intervention bene…ts the agent since it forces the principal to use information that she would not have used otherwise. This informational bene…t denominates the punishment e¤ect when is low and ! is high. For this reason, and perhaps ironically, a commitment not to intervene in the agent decision can be desired by the principal but not by the agent.
Remark Parameter ! can be interpreted as the division of cash- ‡ows between the agent and the principal. Under this interpretation, ! 2 (0; 1) and the principal's utility is rewritten as
). The analysis of the model under this interpretation is the same as in Section 2, with the following two exceptions. First, higher ! reduces the principal's share of v( e ; x), and therefore, could harm her even if it increases her in ‡uence on the agent. Second, higher ! decreases the incentives of the principal to intervene. E¤ectively, the principal behaves as if her cost of intervention is c 1 ! instead of c. This force is another reason why intervention is more likely to prompt disobedience when ! is high.
Extensions
In this section I consider several extensions to the baseline model.
Multiple principals
Suppose there are N 2 principals and one agent (e.g., a board of directors, consortium of investors). The utility function of each principal is given by (3) and each principal observes e . The key di¤erence from the baseline model is that if T N principals intervene then the agent's decision is reversed with probability T =N , and with probability T =N his decision does not change. Each principal incurs the cost c if and only if she decides to intervene, and the agent incurs the cost if and only if intervention succeeds. The decisions to intervene are made simultaneously. These assumptions emphasize the free-rider problem among principals.
Since there is no other con ‡ict of interests between the principals, they will always agree on the instructions that should be sent to the agent and on the action that should be implemented upon intervention (e.g., a majority is obtained if a formal vote is required). The baseline model is a special case where N = 1.
Since all principals would like to avoid intervention, they collectively instruct the agent c, where
is the expected probability of successful intervention employed by the other N 1 principals. 17 Similarly, the expected bene…t from nonintervention is e N 1 N e . Therefore, in equilibrium, each principal intervenes if and only if e < N c, and the probability of intervention is one if e < N c and zero otherwise. Essentially, the equilibrium is the same as the one described by Proposition 2, with the exception that the cost of intervention is N c instead of c. Intuitively, because of the free-rider problem, each principal internalizes only a fraction 1=N of the total bene…t from intervention, and therefore, is less likely to intervene. Therefore, the comparative statics of c can be interpreted as a comparative statics of N . In particular, there is an inverted U-shape relationship between N and the frequency of intervention, and a U-shape relationship between N and the collective ability of principals to exert in ‡uence through communication. 17 The probability of success has a binomial distribution with parameters e and N 1.
Unobservable actions
Suppose the principal does not observe the agent's decision before she intervenes. This corresponds to situations in which the organization is opaque or complex. The principal can still intervene as in the baseline model and dictate the …nal decision, however, she incurs the cost c regardless of the agent's actual decision (otherwise, we are back to the baseline model). I also assume that if the principal intervenes but eventually did not change the agent's action, the agent's does not incur any additional cost.
In this extension, the principal still has incentives to instruct the agent to choose action R if and only if e 0. Similar to the baseline model, the agent always follows the instructions to choose action R. Suppose the principal instructs the agent choose action L, and let G be the probability that the agent follows this instruction in equilibrium. Then, the principal intervenes if and only if e < c 1 G . In the Online Appendix, I show that Proposition 2 continues to hold with the exception that the threshold b ( ; c) is given by the solution of Intuitively, when the principal cannot observe the agent's decision before she decides whether to intervene, the bene…t from intervention is smaller. This situation is equivalent to having a higher cost of intervention. The only complication is that the bene…t from intervention is endogenous, as it depends on the incentives of the agent to follow the principal's instructions, which in turn depends on the incentives of the principal to intervene. This result shows that intervention is more likely to prompt disobedience in organizations that lack transparency.
Partially informed principal
Suppose the principal is partially informed about e (e.g., a generalist manager). For example, the principal observes signal e " with probability 1 ;
where e " and e are identically and independently distributed. The principal does not know whether e s = e or e s = e ". Parameter is the quality of the principal's private information. The baseline model is a special case where = 1. For simplicity, I also assume E[ e ] = 0.
In the Online Appendix, I show that similar to Proposition 2 the agent follows the principal's instructions if and only if e b ( = ; c= ), and similar to Proposition 3 intervention prompts disobedience if and only if
As decreases, the instructions of the principal become a weaker signal of e and the agent's informational bene…ts from intervention decrease. Therefore, the punishment from intervention has a larger impact on the agent's incentives. This e¤ect, which is re ‡ected by the scaling of by in (19) , extends the region in which intervention reinforces compliance. On the other hand, the principal has a larger cost of intervention per unit of information, and therefore, she is less likely to intervene. This e¤ect, which is re ‡ected by the scaling of c by in (19) , extends the region in which intervention prompts disobedience. When the distribution of e is uniform, these a¤ects are cancelled out, and condition (19) is equivalent to (13) for any 2 (0; 1).
Interestingly, without intervention, the agent's compliance increases with : the agent has more reasons to follow the principal's instructions if the latter has more information. However, with intervention, the agent's compliance can decrease with . 18 Intuitively, the informational bene…ts from disobedience increase with . Therefore, the agent has fewer incentives to challenge a relatively uninformed principal. As a result, better informed principals bene…t relatively more from a commitment not to intervene in the agent's decisions.
Continuum of actions
In this section, I consider an extension of the model in which the agent chooses from a continuum of actions. For this purpose, consider the leading example of Crawford and Sobel (1982) , 18 In the Online Appendix, I provide su¢ cient conditions under which 
and the principal's intervention strategy is . As one might expect, the intensity of intervention is decreasing in c and increasing in the distance of x A from e , the principal's ideal point. By "over-shooting" and choosing an extreme action, the agent ensures that the action that is eventually implemented by the principal is closer to his own ideal point, e + . This element is missing from the baseline model. Since the principal corrects the decision of the agent only if it is su¢ ciently distant from e , similar to the intuition in the baseline model, "over-shooting" is not as costly from the agent's perspective. By contrast 
an observation which is consistent with Proposition 3. However, di¤erent from the baseline model, here the quality of communication and the precision of the principal's message (i.e., the number of intervals in the cheap-talk equilibrium partition) also change with the possibility of intervention. In particular, when intervention reinforces compliance (c < ), more information is revealed by the principal in equilibrium (the partition is …ner), and when intervention is counterproductive, the principal's messages become nosier (the partition is coarser).
Informed agent
In this section I consider the setup of Section 3.4 with two-sided information asymmetry.
Speci…cally, suppose e = e P + e A , the principal is privately informed about e P , the agent is privately informed about e A , and e P and e A are independent.
Proposition 7 Suppose the principal sends message m in equilibrium. Then, conditional on e A , the agent chooses action
and the principal's intervention strategy is > for all c < 1. That is, intervention always prompts disobedience
and reduces the quality of communication, even if is arbitrarily large. In this respect, the main result is getting even stronger when the agent is privately informed.
To understand the intuition behind Proposition 7, notice that in a sharp contrast to the analysis in Section 3.4, has no e¤ect on the equilibrium (the informed agent behaves as if = 0). If the agent is uninformed, larger weakens his incentives to choose actions that are distant from the principal's ideal point. However, when the agent is privately informed about e A , choosing a distant action does not increase the intensity of intervention by the principal.
In equilibrium, the principal infers e A from the agent's decision and updates her ideal point accordingly. In particular, the principal rationally interprets distant actions as strong signals about e A . For this reason, taking an action that is closer to the principal's ideal point fails to reduce the intensity of intervention since the principal attributes it to changes in e A . In equilibrium, the principal learn from x A about e A and intervenes to undo the bias in the agent's initial decision, taking into account the cost of intervention. The intensity of intervention, which is measured by
), is independent of x A , and therefore, it is beyond the agent's control. For this reason, does not factor into the agent's consideration when choosing x A . More generally, this observation implies that when the agent is privately informed, the punishment that intervention imposes on the agent has a weaker disciplinary e¤ect. The agent takes more extreme actions in anticipation of the principal's intervention, knowing that the principal will intervene more aggressively only if e P justi…es doing so.
. That is, with private information, the agent is less likely to comply with the principal's instructions, and consequently, communication becomes nosier. This result does not hold when the principal does not have the option to intervene. In those cases, the amount of information that is communicated by the principal is invariant to the agent's private information (Harris and Raviv (2005) ).
Applications
In this section I discuss four main applications of the model.
Managerial leadership
Leadership is often de…ned as the ability to in ‡uence and motivate others to achieve a certain goal successfully (e.g., Hermalin (1998)). It involves articulating a strategy that is appropriate given the organization's strategic position and the environment it faces. Without the ability to persuade others to follow their vision, leaders have to choose between a compromise with an undesired outcome and exercising their authority to bring about a change. The extent to which leaders can use their power depends on various characteristics of the organization and its leadership. As a general message, the model suggests that the ease at which corporate leaders can exercise their power can diminish their ability to in ‡uence others to voluntarily follow their vision. In this regard, the model can be applied to study interactions between managers and their subordinates, owners of small businesses and their employees, …rms and labor unions, or CEOsnheadquarters and division managers.
As an example, consider the interaction between the CEO of a company (principal) and a representative division manager (agent). The …rm has to decide whether to stick with the status quo (x = R) or reorganize the operations of the division (x = L), for example, by divesting some of its assets, standardizing its products, introducing new IT systems, focusing on new geographical areas or products, etc. These decisions are not contractible since their attractiveness depend on a variety of macro, industry, and …rm-speci…c factors which cannot be perfectly anticipated. The CEO has superior knowledge on the bene…t from changing the status quo, e . For example, if the proposal is to divest assets, the CEO has a better understanding of the market conditions, demand for corporate assets by investors, and the external cost of …nancing. If the proposal is to enter new markets, the CEO has a better knowledge of the complementarities with other products of the company, unwanted cannibalization, and alternative investment opportunities. While the CEO is interested in maximizing the value of the whole …rm, the division manager is biased toward maximizing the pro…ts of his division. In particular, the division manager could be biased toward maintaining the status quo ( e > 0).
Generally, the con ‡ict of interests arises because the division manager is being compensated based on the pro…tability of his division or because of his career concerns (his skills are better re ‡ected in the performances of his division). The bias can also stem from private bene…ts (e.g., the prestige of controlling larger assets) or costs (the e¤ort that the implementation of a new strategy requires).
The CEO will lay out her vision and try to persuade the division manager to follow her strategy. If she is unsuccessful, the ability of the CEO to intervene and implement the strategy in spite of the division manager's resistance (parameter c) depends on factors such as the CEO's managerial style (e.g., hands-o¤ approach), the CEO's characteristics (e.g., aversion
to confrontation), the autonomy that was granted to the division over its operations, the complexity of the implementation of the proposed strategy, and the busyness of the CEO (e.g., the alternative cost of intervention is higher when the CEO oversees larger …rms). In turn, intervention is likely to harm the division manager's reputation, ego, or compensation ( > 0).
Applied to this context, the model suggests that CEOs can increase their in ‡uence as leaders
by adopting a hands-o¤ managerial style and delegating authority to their division managers, especially when they oversee large, complex, and opaque organizations (Section 3.2), whose employees are compensated for performances (large !) and have high outside options (low ).
The analysis in Section 3.3 also suggests that generalist CEOs (who have relatively imprecise information about e ) can be more e¤ective than specialist CEOs, and that specialist CEOs would particularly bene…t from adopting a hands-o¤ managerial style.
Corporate boards
In a typical public corporation, the CEO runs the company on a daily basis, but the board of directors sets the strategy, approves major decisions, and has the right to replace the CEO. In many cases, board members are executives in related industries, lawyers, bankers, accountants, academics, and in some cases, savvy investors such as activist hedge fund managers (Gow, Shin, and Srinivasan (2014)) and venture capitalists (even long after the IPO, see Celikyurt, Sevilir and Shivdasani (2014)). These individuals often use their business, legal, and …nance expertise, to advise and direct the CEO on a variety of issues such as strategy, public relations, crisis management, and M&A. In many cases, however, the CEO has a di¤erent agenda. CEOs may try to build and empire, maintain their reputation, or seek the "quite life". Therefore, monitoring the CEO and intervening as needed is an integral part of directors'duties.
Intervention, however, requires coordination among directors (e.g., to avoid free-riding).
Therefore, the e¤ective cost of intervention is higher in larger boards with more diverse and busy directors. Since the ability of the principal (the board) to in ‡uence the agent (the CEO)
is non-monotonic in c, the analysis suggests that the e¤ectiveness of the board's advisory role is also non-monotonic (U-shape) in the number of directors, their diversity, busyness, and independence. In particular, based on Section 3.1, a large board is a commitment device not to intervene in the CEO's decision, and therefore, can be optimal. Importantly, when large boards are optimal, they are also advising the CEO more e¤ectively, which can explain why we observe many large boards (e.g., Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) ).
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The analysis also sheds light on the optimal composition of the board, suggesting that boards with a powerful CEO and a limited capacity of intervention can be optimal. This result is consistent with Adams, Hermalin, and Weisbach (2010) , who observe that corporate boards are often "too friendly"to their CEOs. Moreover, the analysis suggests the a friendly board is more likely to be optimal when the CEO's pay is highly sensitive to …rm performances (high !) or when the CEO does not fear intervention as much (low ). CEOs will not su¤er the consequences of intervention if their reputation in the labor market is already established (e.g., long tenure, proximity to retirement) or if they are entitled to a generous severance package which protects their compensation if they are …red. This prediction di¤ers from Adams and Ferreira (2007) who argue that friendly boards are particularly desired when the CEO dislikes board monitoring the most. Indeed, in their model there is a hold-up problem: the board monitors the CEO more intensively when the latter cooperates. A friendly board is a mean by which the board commits not to monitor the CEO, and more commitment is needed when monitoring in ‡icts larger costs on the CEO (high value of parameter b in their model). 21 In addition, Adams and Ferreira (2007) argue that friendly board are less likely to be optimal when the independent directors are better informed. My model o¤ers a di¤erent prediction: 20 For related studies on optimal board size see also Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) , Harris and Raviv (2008) , and Raheja (2005) . 21 Adams and Ferreira (2007) also show that when board is highly informed, the opposite can hold since it becomes too costly to incentivize the CEO to cooperate by setting a friendly board.
better informed directors (information about actions or fundamentals) can have more in ‡uence on the CEO without intervention, i.e., when the board is friendly.
Private equity
Private equity investors (venture capital and leveraged buyout funds) typically hold board seats and other control rights in their portfolio companies, which give them the power to make strategic decisions, replace management, and even liquidate the …rm Stromberg (2003, 2004 ), Cornelli and Karakas (2015) ). At the same time, these investors also provide expertise and post-investment added value to their portfolio companies. Consistent with this view, the empirical evidence suggests that VCs provide advice and support to small entrepreneurial start-ups, help with the professionalization of the management team and the commercialization of the product, foster innovation, and improve productivity. 22 Similarly, in a typical leveraged buyout, the private equity fund appoints experts from the industry (e.g., Ex-CEOs), consultants, and its own general partners, as board members of the acquired company. Moreover, many of the large PE shops have an in-house operational research team whose purpose is to identify attractive investment opportunities, develop value creation plans for those investments, and help the fund to turnaround the operations of the target …rm after the investment is made (e.g., cost-cutting, productivity improvements, repositioning, or acquisition opportunities). 23 The implications of the model for corporate boards can also be applied to private equity, as in most cases the private equity investors use the board of directors to control the company.
However, relative to boards of public companies, boards of private equity controlled …rms are likely to be better informed (see Section 3.3 for comparative statics with respect to the quality of the principal's private information) and su¤er from fewer coordination problems among directors (see Section 3.1). Nevertheless, private equity …rms tend to co-invest (often referred to as club investment in leveraged buyouts and syndication in venture capital). When the deal has more than one sponsor, the investors share the cash- ‡ows and control rights in the company, which can result in coordination problems between investors. Moreover, private equity …rms make multiple investments. A large number of portfolio companies increases the alternative cost of intervention and the cost of becoming informed about each speci…c portfolio company. While the motives behind co-investment and diversi…cation are likely to be related to capital constraints and risk-sharing, the analysis suggests that they may have additional real bene…ts by committing the private equity investors not to intervene in their portfolio companies.
Shareholder activism
Activist hedge funds have a market-wide perspective on asset valuation and performances of peer companies that corporate boards of public companies often lack. 24 In a typical campaign, the activist buys a sizeable stake in a public company and then engages with the management or the board of directors of the target …rm, expressing her dissatisfaction or view of how the company should be managed. Occasionally, if the company refuses to comply with the activist's demand, the activist ends up litigating or launching a proxy …ght in order to oust the incubment directors, gain board seats, and force her ideas on the company. Running a successful proxy …ght, however, is costly since it requires the activist to reach out to other shareholders of the …rm in order to win their vote.
Applied to this context, the analysis highlights that activist intervention can be counterproductive. Therefore, policies that reduce the cost of intervention for activists (e.g., the adoption of an easier proxy access) and forces that ease the coordination among shareholders (e.g., the rise of institutional/index investment or the increased in ‡uence of proxy advisory …rms) can have unintended adverse consequences. Moreover, the analysis can explain why some activist hedge funds choose to …le schedule 13-G instead of schedule 13-D, build reputation for working constructively with management (e.g., ValueAct) as opposed to being adversarial (e.g., Pershing Square), 25 target companies with dispersed ownership or companies in which obtaining signi…cant voting rights is too costly (large cap or dual class …rms). In all of these instances the activist at least partially commits not to force her ideas on the …rm.
Related, activists investors can always exit their position by selling their stake in the company. If it is easier to exit (e.g., the stock is liquid and the negative price impact upon selling is small) then a displeased activist might be tempted to sell her shares instead of intervening 24 The idea that outsiders have information that insiders can learn from is central to a new literature that studies how …rms use information in stock prices to make investment decisions (e.g., see Bond, Edmans, and Goldstein (2012) for a survey on real e¤ects of …nancial markets). 25 Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy (1999) assume that authority is non-contractible, but can be informally given through commitments enforced by reputation.
when she fails to in ‡uence the board. In other words, the ease at which the activist can exit is a commitment not to intervene by running a proxy …ght. The analysis therefore suggests that when the cost of intervention is high (c > c min ), exit complements the ability of the activist to voice herself and a¤ect the board through communications. However, when the cost of intervention is small (c < c min ), exit harms the ability of the activist to in ‡uence the board using her voice, and in this respect, exit substitutes voice.
Concluding remarks
Interactions between managers, directors, and investors are crucial to our understanding of 
which is always negative. Since e > 0 with probability one, the agent follows the principal's instructions and chooses action R with probability one. Suppose m 2 M L . Since m 2 M L ) e < 0, (26) can be rewritten as
Since (30) which always holds. Therefore, for any realization of e , the principal is weakly better o¤ under in ‡uential equilibrium. Indeed, if e 0 the principal is getting her preferred action under in ‡uential equilibrium without the need to intervene. If e < 0 then, because b ( ; c) > b N , the principal is more likely to get her preferred action under in ‡uential equilibrium, and therefore, can save more of the intervention costs.
According to Proposition 1, in any non-in ‡uential equilibrium, the agent's expected payo¤ conditional on e is 
According to Proposition 2, the agent's expected payo¤ conditional on e in any in ‡uential equilibrium is E[u 
Recall that b N < b ( ; c). Then, e b ( ; c) then the agent is indi¤erent. If e b N then the agent is better o¤ under in ‡uential equilibrium since not only action R is taken more often, he also avoids intervention. If b N < e < b ( ; c) then a direct comparison shows that E[u 
Also note that Proof of Proposition 4. Let and be the pdf and cdf of e , respectively. U P can be rewritten from (14) as
Therefore,
Note that the term in parentheses is positive. Therefore, if @b @c < 0 then @U P @c < 0. According to part (ii) of Corollary 1, if =! E[ e j e 0] + j j then @b @c < 0. Therefore, if =! E[ e j e 0] + j j then @U P @c < 0 as required for part (i). Suppose =! < E[ e j e 0] + j j. Notice that U P ( ; c) is di¤erentiable in c and U P ( ; 0) > U P ( ; j j). Therefore, to prove part (ii) it is su¢ cient to show lim c!j j as required. The last inequality follows from the assumption that v( e ; R) 0. Next,
Based on (34) ,
Therefore, 
Since @b @ > 0, the LHS is increasing in . Suppose =! E[ e j e < 0] + j j. According to part (ii) of Corollary 1 @b @c < 0. Therefore, the LHS of (42) 
However, if =! E[ e j e < 0] + j j holds then (43) holds. Therefore, if =! E[ e j e < 0] + j j then @U P @c > 0, which completes part (i). Suppose (43) does not hold. By the same argument as above, lim c!j j @U A @c < 0. Since lim c!j j U A ( ; c) = U A ( ; j j) > U A ( ; 0), there exists c P as required by part (ii).
Proof of Proposition 6. Conditional on e and the agent's decision, x A , and regardless of the message sent by the principal to the agent, the principal solves
c (x x A ) 2 g ) x P (x A ; e ) = x A + e x A
+ c :
Conditional on x A and e , the principal's utility is u P = ( e x P (x A ; e )) 2 c(x P (x A ; e ) x A ) 2 = c 1 + c ( e x A ) 2 :
The agent expects the principal to follow intervention policy x P (x A ; e ), and therefore, given message m, he solves
x A 2 arg max Proof of Proposition 7. Consider the model without intervention.. As in Harris and Raviv (2005) , in any equilibrium, if the agent observes e A and the principal sends message m, the agent chooses x A ( e A ; m) = e A + E[ e P jm] + . Therefore, the principal's expected utility from sending message m is E[( e P + e A x A ( e A ; m)) 2 j e P ; m] = ( e P E[ e P jm]
which is independent of e A , and hence, perfectly predictable by the principal. Intuitively, the unknown private information of the agent is canceled by the agent's (optimal) choice of x A . We are back to the standard Crawford and Sobel (1982) , where x A ( e A ; m) = e A +x A (m) wherex A (m) is given by the Crawford and Sobel's model when only the principal has private information. Consider the model with intervention. Suppose that in equilibrium the agent follows a linear strategy x A ( e A ; m) = e A + (m) ;
where is a scalar and ( ) is a real function. Conditional on e P , message m, and the agent's decision x A , the principal solves Indeed, if = 0 the principal does not learn anything from action x A about e A . Therefore, the principal chooses x P (x A ; e P ; m) = x A + e P + E[H(x A ; e A ; m)] x A
The agent expects the principal to follow intervention policy x P (x A ; e P ; m), and therefore, given message m and the observation of e A , the agent solves max y E h ( e P + e A + x P (y; e P ; m))
